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I. INTRODUCTION

On January 7, 2004, President George W. Bush proposed a new
temporary worker program to match willing foreign workers with U.S.
employers when no American workers are available to fill the vacantjobs.,
* B.S.Ac., May 2002, University of Florida Fisher School of Accounting; J.D., expected
May 2005, University of Florida Fredric G. Levin College of Law.
1. See Office of the Press Secretary, FactSheet: FairandSecureImmigration Reform (Jan.
7, 2004), availableat http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040107- .html (last
visited Sept. 3, 2004). While the proposal specifically notes that the President "does not support
amnesty [programs] because individuals who violate America's laws should not be rewarded for
illegal behavior and because amnesty perpetuates illegal immigration," the proposal does
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While scholars and politicians have offered a diverse range of strategies
toward reforming U.S. immigration policy, a key issue plaguing these
civic discussions is the enormous number of undocumented workers
currently within U.S. borders.' In particular, critics have opined that the
existence of the undocumented worker undermines both the security and
statistical objectives of U.S. immigration policies.3
To resolve this dilemma, various immigration authorities have
suggested several means to eliminate the undocumented worker from the
U.S. workforce. Some pundits have called for a complete amnesty
program allowing current undocumented workers to gain citizenship.4
Although it is widely assumed that this would be the most effective
method to move as many unrecorded workers to documented status, many
critics decry that a total amnesty program rewards too many immigrants

acknowledge that "America is a welcoming nation, and the hard work and strength of our
immigrants have made our Nation prosperous." Id. The President's proposal would target between
eight and twelve million undocumented workers by offering legal status to existing undocumented
workers for a three-year period, after which time each migrant worker would be required to return
to his or her respective homeland. Rhonda McMillion, New Debateon Immigration,A.B.A. J., Mar.
2004, at 68.
2. See Lori A. Nessel, Undocumented Immigrants in the Workplace: The Fallacy ofLabor
Protectionand the Needfor Reform, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 345,395-404 (2001) (advocating
that immigration policies should cede to both labor law policy and the moral problems stemming
from the undocumented worker); Don Villarejo, Are MigrationandFreeTrade AppropriateForms
of Economic Development? The Case of Mexico and U.S. Agriculture, 9 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 175, 189-95 (2003) (asserting that Mexican migration is the single biggest unresolved trade
issue for both Mexico and the United States, and that immigration policies are shaped by labor
issues).
3. See Nessel, supra note 2, at 395 and accompanying text.
4. Recent bipartisan legislation calling for amnesty programs includes S. 1645 and H.R.
3142, which would allow approximately 500,000 undocumented agricultural workers to obtain
permanent residency. McMillion, supra note 1, at 68. On September 23, 2003, Senators Edward
Kennedy and Larry Craig, among others, first introduced S. 1645, the U.S. Senate version of the
bill. Agricultural Job Opportunity, Benefits, and SecurityAct of2003. S. 1645, 108th Cong. (2003).
On September 23, 2003, Representatives Howard Berman and Chris Cannon introduced H.R. 3142,
the U.S. House of Representatives version of the bill. Agricultural Job Opportunity, Benefits, and
Security Act of 2003, H.R. 3142, 108th Cong. (2003). For a summary of the provisions in these
bills, see Bill Beardall, Thumbnail Summary: Proposed Federal Legislation to Legalize
UndocumentedFarm Workers: The AgriculturalJobs, Opportunity,Benefits, and Security Act of
2003 ("AGJOBS") (2004), availableat http://www.equaljusticecenter.org/newpage 46.htm (last
visited Sept. 3, 2004).
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for engaging in illegal behavior. 5 Moreover, amnesty programs are
considered unfair to many foreigners who have waited patiently within the
legal channels of immigration only to ultimately be prohibited from
entering the United States.6

In opposition to amnesty programs, some immigration authorities have
suggested a comprehensive enforcement policy whereby prodigious

resources are consumed in locating and deporting undocumented workers
to their homelands.' Beyond mere detection procedures, these
comprehensive policies would also impose sanctions on those employers
who utilize undocumented workers. 8 Subjecting employers to severe
penalties could curb the future employment of illegal aliens. Yet, these
same penalties would also impose a heavy burden upon employers to
investigate prospective workers' immigration status.9 Many analysts have
5. Former U.S. Senator Phil Gramm, one of the most outspoken critics of amnesty programs
for illegal immigrants, was at odds with his Republican brethren, including President Bush, for their
support of these programs. Ralph Z. Hallow, GOP Sees Woes With Mexican Amnesty Says
Immigrants to be Democrats,WASH. TIMES, Aug. 16,2001, at Al. Noting his vehement opposition,
Senator Gramm characterized amnesty programs as "a bad policy that rewards illegal behavior and
encourages more of it." Id.
6. An unidentified aide of U.S. Representative Tom Tancredo, a Colorado Republican and
chair of the Congressional Caucus on Immigration Reform, complained that granting illegal
immigrants amnesty would be a "kick in the teeth to the thousands of individuals across the world
who are legally attempting to enter the United States." August Gribbin, Bush Mexican Amnesty
Plan Resurfaces, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2002, at Al.
7. In fact, many advocates of these strategies continue to push the enforcement of rarely
implemented existing laws to locate and arrest illegal aliens. Senators ProposeCrackingDown on
Illegal Immigrants Without Punishing States, AUGUSTA CHRON., Nov. 20, 2003, at http://
augustachronicle.com/stories/1 12103/met_ 124-5331 .shtml (last visited Jan. 4,2005). Even though
he proposed a measure to enhance the overall ability of enforcing agents, Senator Zell Miller
seemed to agree that his proffered legislation would not be necessary if federal officers simply
followed and enforced the existing regulations that allow for the arrest and detention of suspected
illegal immigrants. Id.
8. Nessel, supra note 2, at 360. An example of an implemented policy is Operation
Vanguard, which subjects all the meatpacking employers in a defined region to inspections of their
employee records by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). Id. If inspectors, upon a
review of the employee's documentation, consider an employee an illegal immigrant, the employer
must fire the worker or risk immediate sanctions. Id.
9. See Jennifer Gordon, We Make the Road by Walking: Immigrant Workers, the Workplace
Project,and the Strugglefor Social Change, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 407, 414 n.27 (1995).
The real burden of employer sanctions, however, is not borne by employers. In
practice, employer sanctions empower employers to terrorize their workers.
Frequently, employers in the underground economy ignore sanctions or accept
false documents when they hire their workers. Later, when immigrants attempt to
organize or otherwise defend their rights, employers suddenly "realize" that they
must comply with employer sanctions, and fire anyone who cannot provide valid
documents to fill out an 1-9 form. If the immigrants press matters any further,
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argued that these measures would be too costly for employers. Considering
the increasing competition between employers within the global
marketplace, it may also be unrealistic to expect employers to morally
adhere to fungible labor regulations.10
Mired with a slumping national economy and the lingering security
fears following the September 11th terrorist attacks, the Bush
administration offered a temporary worker program as a controversial
departure from traditionally restrictive immigration laws.11 In permitting
U.S. employers to use undocumented workers when American workers are
unavailable to fill the employment vacancies - even when U.S.
unemployment rates were the highest in nearly a decade12 - the Bush
administration seemingly acknowledged that some employment within the
United States is unsuitable for the American worker. Underlying the policy
reform, the proposal also hinted that the detection and deportation of these
workers as a singular means toward their absolute elimination was an
ineffective method of immigration control.
With respect to the undocumented worker, the potential departure from
restrictive immigration law unearths serious questions.13 Primarily, the
reform poses an inquiry as to whether the prohibition of the undocumented
worker is an attainable goal. Moreover, while proponents of the Bush
proposal typically assume an otherwise lawful undocumented worker, a
presupposition underlying a departure from the conventional view of
lawbreakers may be a dangerous assumption at a time when border
security is in need of heightened scrutiny. These opposing questions
employers often threaten to turn them in to the Immigration and Naturalization
Service. Thus, these sanctions have enabled employers to maintain an intimidated
workforce and cheap labor pool whose members never complain to the authorities
about mistreatment.
Id.; see also Nessel, supra note 2, at 362 (referring to employer sanctions as "employer swords,"
whereby employers can terrorize their undocumented employees because of the threat of possible
sanctions).
10. Villarejo, supra note 2, at 189 (describing how employers evaded "knowingly"
employing undocumented workers by not scrutinizing their employees' fraudulent identification
documents).
11. See Office of the Press Secretary, supra note 1 and accompanying text.
12. According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, the approximately 6% unemployment
rate experienced for seven consecutive months in 2003 had not occurred in the United States since
1994. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, LaborForceStatistics Fromthe CurrentPopulationSurvey
(2004), availableat http://data.bls.gov/servlet/SurveyOutputServlet?data-tool=latest-numbers&
seriesid=LNS 14000000 (last visited Sept. 3, 2004).
13. See Nessel, supranote 2, at 405 (questioning "why immigration laws continue to rely on
nebulous fictions rather than accord membership rights to those who live and work among us" and
the concerns and benefits that stem from a potential change).
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concerning the undocumented worker are seemingly a contemporary
version of the longstanding debates analyzing both the "means and ends"
of social order and the role of the "bad man" in jurisprudence. This Note,
after a summary of these lawmaking philosophies, will recount a brief
history of undocumented worker jurisprudence, including the recent
developments regarding the Bush proposal. Then, following an application
of these contrasting notions, this Note will examine the overall legislative
trend within immigration law. Finally, this Note will offer some
conclusions, within the constraints of the discussed jurisprudence,
regarding the soundness of the Bush proposal.
II. NOTIONS OF SOCIAL ORDER AND HOLMES'S "BAD MAN"

A. Fuller's "Means andEnds " Analysis
Lon Fuller, the noted Harvard law professor, in criticizing the onedimensional theory of utilitarianism, suggested that creating laws by first
determining the end desired was too simplistic. 4 John Stuart Mill reduced
this utilitarian model as follows: "When we engage in a pursuit, a clear and
precise conception of what we are pursuing would seem to be the first
thing we need, instead of the last we are to look forward to."' 5 In a
nutshell, this theory of legislative construction ignores many realistic
factors that render certain objectives unattainable. Rather than worrying
about external pressures that may thwart a desired end, Mill would argue
that these external factors should not change the objective sought, but
rather alter the scheme implemented. 6
As an alternative, Fuller contended that the only proper method of
creating "good" social architecture was a method that considered the
14. See LON FULLER, Means and Ends, in THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER 47 (1981).
15. JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 2
(1951). In expanding the importance of the end sought in forming legislation, Mill stated:

But though in science the particular truths precede the general theory, the contrary
might be expected to be the case with a practical art, such as morals or legislation.
All action is for the sake of some end, and rules of action, it seems natural to
suppose, must take their whole character and color from the end to which they are
subservient.
Id.
16. See id.
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"means-cost," or in plain terms, the price of attaining the law's objective.17
Even if the objective was a righteous goal, Fuller urged that "we must
know what is possible before discussing what is desirable.' 8" Thus, an
evaluation of the "means-cost" is as equally important as the evaluation of
the end sought in creating workable social arrangements.' 9 In clear
opposition to Mill's position, Fuller stated that "[s]ome limitation of
means, imposed by circumstances or voluntarily accepted, is essential for
an intelligent definition of the end sought."2 Conversely, in the instances
where a certain social architecture, beyond its intended aim, results in a
secondary, positive end, Fuller also advocated that proper lawmaking must
account for this "means-surplus."2
Within this theoretical framework, Fuller called for a reassessment of
several assumptions commonly made about ends and means as they affect
social arrangements. One assumption that Fuller asserted as a mistaken
belief is the assumption referred to as "the infinite pliability of social
arrangements., 22 This belief supposes that implementation is a mere matter
of technique, and social arrangements are malleable to any desired end.23
Fuller noted that this mistaken belief is really an underlying principle of
the greater misperception that the first task of social philosophy is the
prioritizing of social ends.24 In dismissing the "mere matter of technique"
concept, Fuller writes, "It takes something more than a rub of the
technician's lamp to bring into 25existence a social procedure apt for the
solution of any given problem.,
As a practical matter, Fuller's notions of lawmaking are exemplified in
the efforts to combat narcotics trafficking. While eliminating the
consumption of harmful drugs may be a desirable end, the costs currently
utilized to stop illegal trafficking, e.g., police enforcement, incarceration,
17. FULLER, supra note 14, at 55 (in contemplating the end sought, "no abstractly conceived
end ever remains the same after it has been given flesh and blood through some specific form of
social implementation").
18. Id.at 50.
19. Id. at 55.
20. Id. at 51. "Reversing Mill, we may truthfully say that a social end takes its 'character and
color' from the means by which it is realized." Id. at 55.
21. Id. In formulating his theory, Fuller questioned whether we can "discover a means of
realizing EndA that will yield, as a kind of by-product, some satisfaction of End B[.]" Id.
22. FULLER, supra note 14, at 56.
23. Id.
24. Id. Fuller demonstrates an extreme example of this principle in rejecting the belief that
the preservation of human life must have the highest priority in the design of any social edifice. See
id. at 55-56. Fuller notes that St. Thomas observed "if the highest duty of a captain were really to
preserve his ship, he would keep it in port forever. Hence, even the preservation of human life fails
to secure a fixed schedule of ends." Id. at 56.
25. Id.at 57.
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public education, etc., are quite expensive." Yet, there are many observers
who desire the complete removal of these drugs at any cost. Clearly, these
observers have taken a utilitarian approach to narcotics, whereby the
desired end is the first step in constructing their legislative means.
Conversely, there are others who desire a more realistic approach to
eliminating drug trafficking that considers the extraordinary demand for
narcotics.2" These observers believe that the resources do not exist to
completely end illegal trafficking, and consequently they label this goal as
both unattainable and a poor legislative objective with a lofty "meanscost."28 Some within this group have called for the total abandonment of
drug trafficking regulations as a legislative end.29 Other observers consider
the elimination of illegal drug use a virtuous end, and they assert that the
only changes necessary are those that alter the means employed to
continue the prohibition of most narcotics.30 These observers have called
for increasing education on the dangers of drug use as a means to curb
overall demand rather than simply sanctioning drug users.3 Yet, there are
26. OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY:

FY 2005 BUDGET SUMMARY 1 (2004). According to the Office of National Drug Control Policy,
in 2004 the United States spent approximately $12.1 billion to stop drug use, heal drug users, and
disrupt the illegal drug market. Id. Looking ahead, the United States has increased its budget
estimates in 2005 nearly 4.7% (an increase of over $566 million) to continue its "war on drugs."
Id.
27. Possibly the most infamous proponent ofdecriminalizing a greatly demanded illegal drug
is the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML). See National
Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws, NORML Mission Statement, available at
http://www.norml.org/index.cfm?GrouplD=3414 (last visited Sept. 3, 2004). NORML's mission
"is to move public opinion sufficiently to achieve the repeal of marijuana prohibition so that the
responsible use of cannabis by adults is no longer subject to penalty." Id
28. See, e.g., Maria Botey Pascual, A Conversationwith Gustavo de Grieff,NARCO NEWS
BULL., Nov. 14,2002, availableathttp://la.indymedia.org/news/2002/11/22667_comment.php (last
visited Jan. 4, 2005). Gustavo de Greiff, former Attorney General of Columbia, asserted that "the
only path to ending narco-trafficking is drug legalization" due to both inherent corruption and
escalating costs associated with prohibition. Id.
29. Several organizations, such as the Drug Reform Coordination Network (DRCNet), seek
to "bring the currently uncontrolled markets in illegal drugs within the law, [as] a necessary step
in reestablishing popular respect for our legal institutions... and securing the public health and
welfare." DRCNet, Mission Statement, available at http://stopthedrugwar.org/aboutdrc/mission.
shtml (last visited Sept. 3, 2004).
30. See, e.g., Common Sense for Drug Policy, About Common Sensefor DrugPolicy, Mar.
28, 2004, available at http://www.csdp.org/about.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2005). The nonprofit
organization Common Sense for Drug Policy is dedicated to "raising questions about existing law
and educating the public about alternatives to current policies" to create a more effective drug
policy. Id.
31. Beyond these educational programs, some critics have called for drastic post-conviction
reforms for drug offenders. Thomas D. Elias, Drug Offenders Get Rehab, Not JailBackers Behind
CaliforniaProposition Expanding Efforts, WASH. TIMES, July 16, 2001, at Al. In particular,
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still other pundits that demand large expenditures to solidify the national
borders - not only because of the resulting crack-down on illegal drug
trafficking - but also because of the positive by-products derived from an
otherwise secure border.32 If the resources utilized in monitoring drug
trafficking also aid in securing national borders from illegal aliens, this
synergy should be acknowledged as a means-surplus. Although basic
concepts, these realistic notions of "means-cost" and "means-surplus" are
often left out of the lawmaking process.33
B. Holmes 's "BadMan" Principle
Long before Fuller's conception of ideal lawmaking, Oliver Wendell
Holmes asserted that, instead of using agreed upon moralities as a basis for
legislative penalties, laws should be created that effectively sanction the
"bad man" seeking to subvert the law.34 In Holmes's opinion, the role of
lawyers was to predict outcomes for their clients under the law.35
Considering society's differing morals, to correctly predict legal outcomes
lawyers must observe the law from the perspective of a bad man who
ignores ethical rules believed and practiced by his neighbors.36 Along the
same line, the proper method to create laws - and formulate effective
penalties - must also account for the bad man.37 Otherwise, the lawmaker
might misperceive the effectiveness of a particular law as a deterrent.38 By
viewing the law through the eyes of the "bad man," drafters may see it as
it really is: "washed with cynical acid, and divorced from ethical values."39

financier George Soros, Cleveland insurance mogul Peter Lewis, and University of Phoenix founder
John Sperling collectively have spent more than $3.5 million to back a California proposition that
would send drug users to rehabilitation facilities instead of prisons. Id.
32. See Andrew Reding, Mexico's Crackdown Good,Bad News, ARIz. DAILY STAR, Mar. 14,
2003, available at http://worldpolicy.org/globalrights/mexico/2002-0314-AZDailyStar-Cartel%
20crackdown.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2005) (highlighting that the United States experiences
positive economic externalities with Mexico after a successful drug crackdown).
33. If one takes a utilitarian approach to legislative drafting (which often occurs when
drafters create legislation geared towards the absolute prohibition of a specific behavior), it often
follows that the drafters will care little about potential by-products after effects of the legislation.
34. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897).
35. See id.
at 458 ("The primary rights and duties with whichjurisprudence busies itself again
are nothing but prophecies.").
36. Id. at 459. "A man who cares nothing for an ethical rule which is believed and practised
by his neighbors is likely nevertheless to care a good deal to avoid being made to pay money, and
will want to keep out ofjail if he can." Id.
37. See id.
38. See id.at 461.
39. LON FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 92, 92-93 (1940).
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In formulating legislation, Holmes argued that the imposed sanction
alone should sufficiently deter the unlawful activity.4' This legislative
construction is necessary because Holmes's bad man will ignore his fellow
citizen's perceptions of a general duty to obey the law.4' From Holmes's
perspective, the bad man simply calculates the cost of being caught and
weighs it against the cost of complying with the law.42 If the cost of being
caught is less harmful than the cost of complying with the law, the bad
man will choose to evade the law.43 Moreover, the Holmesian "bad man"
who cares nothing for an ethical rule still has as much reason as a "good
man" for avoiding an encounter with the public force." Therefore,
efficient sanctions should deter all potential violators from engaging in
unwanted activities rather than merely discouraging those potential
violators who agree with the legislation's moral underpinnings.
For a realistic hypothetical, one only needs to look at the goal of
eliminating unwanted paperwork in regulatory compliance matters. To
effectively eliminate the accumulation of paperwork in regulatory
compliance, sufficient penalties should be assessed on the failure to pay
on the first notice of fees due.45 Even if the penalties for noncompliance
are weak, some potential violators will pay on the first notice simply
because it is both their contractual and moral obligation to do so. However,
many others will delay their payment until a harmful penalty is imminent.
In particular, Holmes's bad man will observe the economic principle of the
time value of money and delay his payment, resulting in the production of
a second notice of fees due.46 Thus, weak sanctions will actually lead to an
increase of second notice paperwork and fail to reduce the already
burdensome amount of paperwork plaguing regulatory compliance.
While even Fuller found the undemanding notion of the "bad man" a
bit too simplistic,47 it is clear that this concept exists within modem
40. See Holmes, supra note 34, at 459.
41. Id.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. Id. ("[One] can see very plainly that a bad man has as much reason as a good one for
wishing to avoid an encounter with the public force ... ").
45. Robert C.L. Moffat, Obligation to Obey the Law: Substance and Procedure in the
ThoughtofLon Fuller,4 INT'LJ. APPLIEDPHIL. 33,41 (1983). "In such situations, government will
discover it necessary to increase the costs of noncompliance by escalating punishments for
subsequent offenses, for example." Id.
46. Id.
47. FULLER, supranote 39, at 92-95. Fuller argued that Holmes's "bad man" had two blatant
flaws. First, Fuller noted that "it is a peculiar sort of bad man who is worried about judicial decrees
and is indifferent to extra-legal penalties, who is concerned about a fine of two dollars but
apparently not about the possible loss of friends and customers." Id. at 93. Second, Fuller points
out that Holmes assumed his "bad man" had already come to a legal conclusion about a certain line
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lawmaking. Moreover, both Fuller's and Holmes's legal concepts are
shaping the evolution of immigration jurisprudence, particularly laws
concerning the punishment and disapproval of the undocumented worker.
HI.

DESCRIPTION OF THE UNDOCUMENTED WORKER

The undocumented worker is simply a worker without any government
records available to verify the person's existence. Employers do not keep
records, such as a green card, social security number, or a driver's license,
to monitor the worker's legal status.48 This differs from an employee who
works for an employer "off the books" because typically
these employees
are kept off the employer's bookkeeping records to avoid tax
implications.49 These "off the book" workers are sometimes citizens or
legal aliens of the United States and are generally documented by a social
security or identification number. True undocumented workers must avoid
this recording process as their illegal entry into the United States will
subject them to a swift deportation back to their respective homeland."
Many of these undocumented workers occupy jobs that pay low wages
and require strenuous manual labor. These jobs are usually "unwanted" by
the American worker, as they provide a low wage for the performance of
difficult work.5 ' Although new regulations could raise the wages for these
jobs and increase their desirability to the American worker, special interest
groups have fostered a political climate that enables some employers to
continue offering a substandard wage.52 Additionally, some interest groups
contend that an artificially high wage will only increase labor costs,

of conduct, and Holmes "neglects to inquire into the process by which this man would actually
arrive at such a conclusion." Id. Essentially, Fuller finds that, for the "bad man" to correctly
forecast the law, he will also need to ask a question of morality: How would the "good man" view
my conduct? Id. at 94-95.
48. See Villarejo, supra note 2, at 189.
49. Ben Jacklet, Off-the-Books Workers Follow the Cash Trail, PORTLAND TRIB., Oct. 10,
2003 (underground market of day laborers enables employers to avoid millions in taxes), available
at http://www.portlandtribune.com/archview.cgi?id=20785 (last visited Oct. 25, 2004).
50. Villarejo, supra note 2, at 189.
51. Nessel, supra note 2, at 347.
52. See, e.g., Michael Lind, Commentary: Say No to Guest-Workers, July 6, 2001, available
athttp://www.sci.sdsu.edu/salton/SayNoToGuest-workers.html (last visited Jan. 4,2005). Michael
Lind, a senior fellow at the New America Foundation, asserts that agribusiness interests are pushing
guest-worker legislation rather than increasing low wages to continue to pay a substandard wage.
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resulting in a barrier for these employers to fairly compete within the
global marketplace.53
While employers may face moral scrutiny for the exploitation of illegal
immigrants at wages below generally accepted minimums, these workers
will likely earn more than they would earn for similar work in their
homelands.5 4 Similarly, these low labor expenditures allow the employers
to produce a lower-cost product, which in turn allows the employer to
remain competitive with its market rivals.55 Some observers have conceded
that the United States will always have some level of undocumented
workers so long as neighboring countries allow many of their citizens to
live in poverty.56 It is also widely thought that tracking down all current
undocumented workers and deporting them to their respective homeland57
would prove too costly and arduous, and is thus not a realistic solution.

53. See, e.g., National Federation of Independent Business, Increases in Minimum Wage Hurt
SmallBusinessandEmployees, availableathttp://www.nfib.com/page/pg_20040527609688.html
(last visited Jan. 4, 2005). For example, the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB)
opposes any increase in the minimum wage, because the increased wage unfairly hurts small
businesses within the global marketplace. Id.
54. Logic would dictate this, because otherwise it is hard to reason why these workers would
risk their health and safety during their illegal entry and continued illegal status in the United
States.
55. See Ron Bigler, When Companies Will Do Anything for Cheap Labor, THE LABOR
RESEARCH ASSOCIATION ONLINE, Dec. 20, 2001, at http://www.laborresearch.org/story2.php/78
(last visited Oct. 25, 2004) (describing Tyson Foods, Inc.'s use of illegal aliens to stay competitive
within the poultry industry). Six managers at Tyson Foods, Inc. were indicted by the
federal government for allegedly smuggling illegal immigrants from Mexico to work in the
company's plants. Id.
56. Louis Freedberg & Ramon G. McLeod, The Other Side of the Law: Despite All U.S.
Efforts to Curb It, Immigration is Rising, SAN FRAN. CHRON., Oct. 13, 1998 (quoting
Representative Lamar Smith as admitting, "[The United States] will always have people trying to
come into the country illegally, but we hope that by doubling the Border Patrol agents we will cut
illegal immigration in half.").
57. Dan Eggen, Ridge Revives Debate on Immigration Status, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 2003,
at A08. Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge insinuated that allocating the necessary resources
to end all illegal immigration within the United States was not ideal when he told a Miami audience
"as a country we have to come to grips with the presence of 8 [million] to 12 million illegals [in
the United States]." Id.
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IV. SUMMARY OF UNDOCUMENTED WORKER JURISPRUDENCE

A. PRE-SURE-TAN JURISPRUDENCE

Before 1986, labor law was relatively silent on the employment of
undocumented workers.58 Strangely, the undocumented worker is often
incongruously unlawful yet pragmatically necessary to perform needed but
undesirable employment at the lowest possible wages.5 9 Yet, excluding
undocumented workers from labor protection can result in their
exploitation, which can have a chilling effect upon the rights of all
workers.6" Therefore, courts have interpreted various labor protections to
apply equally to all workers, regardless of immigration status. 6 1
B. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB
In Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB,62 the U.S. Supreme Court was forced to
interpret the definition of "employee" under the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA). The question presented was whether the NLRA protected all
workers regardless of immigration status. 63 Finding that undocumented
workers were clearly within the broad NRLA definition of "employee," '
Justice O'Connor noted in the majority opinion:
Application of the NLRA helps to assure that the wages and
employment conditions of lawful residents are not adversely
affected by the competition of illegal alien employees who are not
subject to the standard terms of employment. If an employer
realizes that there will be no advantage under the NLRA in
preferring illegal aliens to legal resident workers, any incentive to
hire such illegal aliens is correspondingly lessened. In turn, if the
demand for undocumented aliens declines, there may then be fewer
incentives for aliens themselves to enter in violation of the federal
immigration laws.65

O'Connor's eloquent statement is a clear summary of the effect the
unequal treatment of a class of workers has on overall employment.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Nessel, supra note 2, at 352.
Id. at 347.
Id.
Id.at 347-48.
467 U.S. 883 (1984).
Id.at 891.
Id.
Id.at 893-94.
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However, the majority also held within the same opinion that
undocumented workers were not entitled to the same remedies as other
workers under the NRLA.6 6
By not allowing the same remedies for undocumented workers that
other workers have for claims against their employers, Sure-Tan
consequently created a divide between protection and remedy.67 This gap,
instead of lessening the preference of illegal aliens over legal workers,
actually created an incentive for employers to hire illegal aliens. Quick to
point out this potential pitfall, which soon became a realized fear, Justice
Brennan commented in his dissenting opinion:
Once employers, such as petitioners, realize that they may
violate the NLRA with respect to their undocumented alien
employees without fear of having to recompense those workers for
lost backpay, their "incentive to hire such illegal aliens" will not
decline, it will increase. And the purposes of both the NLRA and
the Immigration and Naturalization Act that are supposedly served
by today's decision will unquestionably be undermined.68
After years of observing employers circumventing the intent of the SureTan decision, Congress enacted a drastic immigration reform to end the
use of illegal aliens for cheap labor.
C. The Immigration Reform and ControlAct
To curb the use of undocumented workers,69 in 1986 Congress enacted
the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA),70 which made it
unlawful for employers to knowingly hire undocumented immigrants.7 '
The IRCA, through an amnesty program, also gave certain undocumented
immigrants who had resided continuously in the United States since 1982
the opportunity to obtain legal status.72 Believing that employment is a
chief attraction for undocumented workers to the United States," Congress
enacted within the IRCA a series of employer sanctions as a deterrent for
66. Id. at 897.
67. Nessel, supra note 2, at 352.
68. Sure-Tan, Inc., 467 U.S. at 912 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
69. Nessel, supra note 2, at 357.
70. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 101(a)(1),
100 Stat. 3359 (1986).
71. Villarejo, supranote 2, at 189-90.
72. IRCA § 245A(a)(2)(A); see also Nessel, supra note 2, at 355.
73. Nessel, supra note 2, at 357 ("The IRCA is premised upon the belief that employment
is the magnet that pulls immigrants to the United States.").

UNIVERSITY OFFLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

(Vol. 16

employers to seek out these workers.74 These sanctions obligated
employers to verify each worker's employment eligibility, and
correspondingly held the employer accountable if the worker was not
documented." To satisfy the IRCA, employers required employees to
demonstrate their eligibility through the production of original documents,
76
such as Social Security cards, micas, passports, or driver's licenses.
For a multitude of reasons, the IRCA failed to solve the undocumented
worker dilemma." A major factor in the IRCA's inability to end the
employment of undocumented workers was the exploitation of a legal
loophole within the legislation.78 Specifically, the sanctions described in
the IRCA could only be imposed on employers who "knowingly"
employed undocumented workers.79 Thus, an employer who claims
ignorance in his or her ability to distinguish authentic documentation from
fraudulent documentation can escape sanctions so long as the employee
can produce some form of identification.80 According to Dr. Dean
Villarejo, the former executive director of the California Institute of Rural
Studies, "The 'IRCA loophole' has made it possible for hundreds of
thousands, if not millions, of undocumented workers to be hired, provided
their supporting documents appear to be authentic and their employer was
willing to risk the possibility of being charged with violations."'" It is now
widely believed that the number of undocumented workers within the
United States is greater than before the IRCA was enacted.82
It is quite probative of the IRCA's weak sanctions that Dr. Villarejo
utilized the term "willing" in describing some employers' conduct under
the law.83 As Dr. Villarejo's statement implies, employers were unafraid
to challenge the "knowingly" test within the statute."4 Yet, even if the
government suspected an employer violation, some of the IRCA's
74. Section 274A(e)(4) provides for cease and desist orders and civil money penalties of up
to $10,000, while section 274A(f) provides "criminal penalties and injunctions for pattern or
practice violations." IRCA § 274A(e)(4) & (f).
75. Section 274A(b) requires employers to examine documents within a specified list and
attest that a hired individiual "is not an unauthorized alien." Id.§ 274A(b)(1)(A).
76. Id.
77. See Nessel, supra note 2, at 357 (the IRCA ignores many factors affecting migration in
the modem world, such as population demographics, increasingly inequitable distribution ofwealth,
and technological advancements).
78. Villarejo, supranote 2, at 189.
79. "It is unlawful for a person or other entity to hire ...an alien knowing the alien is an
unauthorized alien.... IRCA § 274A(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
80. See Villarejo, supra note 2, at 189-90.
81. Idat 190.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See id.

THE UNDOCUMENTED WORKER

provisions actually made the sanctions more difficult to enforce. 5 For
example, the IRCA banned workplace raids unless a search warrant was
obtained in advance of the raid. 6 This procedural and evidentiary
requirement did not exist prior to the IRCA's enactment.8 7
Another IRCA provision, the "family unification" principle, both
increased the number of undocumented workers in the United States and
gave employers a more direct supply of labor. 8 In adopting this provision,
the IRCA allowed immigrants with permanent legal resident status,
including persons whose status was regularized under IRCA amnesty, to
bring otherwise unauthorized family members into the United States and
regularize their status.89 Instead of lessening the flow of illegal
immigration to the United States, these IRCA provisions stimulated new
immigration that has resulted in substantially more undocumented workers
than before the IRCA. 90
V. THE BUSH PROPOSAL FOR IMMIGRATION REFORM

Since the enactment of the IRCA, there have been only minor attempts
to slow the number of undocumented workers within the United States.
Although many consider the elimination of these workers a desirable goal,
budget and political constraints have tabled this issue for nearly a decade.
However, as the events of September 11 th have done for so many national
issues, the issue of undocumented illegal aliens within U.S. borders has
resurfaced amidst new efforts to increase national security.
President Bush, proposing a change in immigration law, offered a new
guest worker program to better supply documented labor for many vacant
jobs within the United States. 9' According to the Bush administration, this
particular immigration reform served five objectives: (1) protecting the
United States by better controlling its borders with participating
countries;92 (2) strengthening the U.S. economy by providing a needed
85. Villarejo, supra note 2, at 190.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Villarejo, supra note 2, at 190.

91. Office of the Press Secretary, supranote 1 and accompanying text.
92. Id. "The program should link to efforts to control our border through agreements with
countries whose nationals participate in the program. It must support ongoing efforts to enhance
homeland security." Id.
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labor supply to U.S. employers,93 (3) promoting compassion within U.S.
immigration policies by preventing the exploitation of undocumented
aliens;94 (4) providing incentives for these temporary workers to return to
their home countries by allowing travel during the work period;" and (5)
protecting the rights of legal immigrants by not connecting the program to
a green card or eventual citizenship.96 At the heart of these objectives, this
proposal attempted to address concerns stemming from the increasing
number of undocumented foreign workers already employed in the United
97
States.
It was also asserted that, in moving many illegal aliens to documented
status, this program would create a safer environment in the United States
through two means. First, it would enhance the information available to
various government agencies responsible for the oversight of immigration
and border control. 98 Second, it would entice these undocumented workers
with an economic "carrot," 99 allowing the worker to earn a paycheck
without the fear of deportation.°° Moreover, these workers would be more
likely to abstain from illegal behavior rather than jeopardize their "carrot"
and risk an ensuing extradition.
In touting the practical externalities of its proposed guest worker
program, the Bush administration suggested that this reform would allow
current undocumented workers to come out of hiding and participate in
America's economy while not encouraging further illegal behavior.' 0 '
These workers, through their basic consumption activities, already
participate in their local economies and even contribute a portion of their
spending towards government taxation. However, undocumented workers
avoid many other consumption activities as a result of their fear of
deportation, and their undocumented status allows income tax avoidance.
By removing the risk of deportation, it is reasonable to assume that these
93. Id. In creating this labor pool, the President advocates means that "[are] clear,
streamlined, and efficient so people can find jobs and employers can find workers in a timely
manner." Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.The guest worker program should also "allow movement across the U.S. borders so
the worker can maintain roots in their home country." Id.
96. Office of the Press Secretary, supra note 1 and accompanying text.
97. Id.
98. Id."It is in the interest of the Nation, and each community, to identify foreign visitors and
immigrants and make clear the nature of their intentions." Id.
99. By allowing these workers to earn a wage without the fear of deportation, these workers
do not have to spend a portion of their earnings either hiding their undocumented status or
continually evading border authorities during the workers' trips to and from their homeland.
100. Office of the Press Secretary, supranote 1 and accompanying text.
101. Id.
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workers will engage in comparatively more consumption activity." 2
Likewise, a newly recorded employment status will require the worker, as
well as his or her employer, to partake in tax compliance and employment
regulation activities. As there appears a demand for employment that
Americans will not satisfy, this proposal should logically fulfill
employers' labor needs, resulting in increased efficiency and greater
production levels.
Although this practical view of the Bush immigration reform seems
quite beneficial to the U.S. economy, there are several glaring problems
with evaluating the soundness of the Bush proposal. The first problem is
whether the objective of eliminating the undocumented worker is even
attainable and if these means are truly the best way of bringing about this
goal. If the undocumented worker is merely a single concern among many
immigration policy objectives, it might prove unwise to isolate this
concern along with the means to remove it. Furthermore, abandoning
restrictive immigration policies because of changing attitudes towards a
tactic's effectiveness could affect other important policy objectives,
particularly if the restrictions are in place for several purposes beyond the
prohibition of undocumented workers. These externalities, whether
positive or negative, must be considered in evaluating the worth of the
Bush proposal. Additionally, the failure of prior attempts to eliminate the
undocumented worker requires an evaluation of the prior methods and the
overall policy goals, rather than simply a change for change's sake.
The second problem in evaluating the soundness of the Bush proposal
is that one must acquire the mindset of an illegal immigrant, including the
immigrant's reasons for violating U.S. law during his or her undocumented
employment, to anticipate whether the illegal immigrant will comply with
the legislation. Along those same lines, it now appears that the assumption
that employers, on primarily ethical grounds, would comply with
previously weak restrictions concerning the hiring of illegal aliens was
incorrect. To better evaluate Bush's proposal, an application of Fuller's
and Holmes's legal reasoning is helpful to understand the changing trends
within immigration law.
VI. APPLICATION OF FULLER'S "MEANS AND ENDS" ANALYSIS

Clearly, Fuller's notion of "means and ends" is evident in the evolving
jurisprudence concerning the undocumented worker. In its crudest form,
Fuller's notion is about creating legislation with constraints based upon

102. Id.
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realistic,, real-world assumptions." °3 Applying Fuller's concept of social
order, the concession of the undocumented worker has been gradually
shaping U.S. immigration law since the 1980s. Without this constraint,
immigration law would have maintained its traditionally restrictive tenor
aimed at the elimination of all illegal immigration.
In acknowledging the existence of the undocumented worker, U.S.
immigration law has slowly allowed for their integration within the U.S.
economy.'0 4 Legislative drafters understand that undocumented workers
are not merely falling through the cracks of a faulty immigration policy,'0 5
but are rather externalities associated with the comparative economic
advantage of the United States relative to its neighbors.'0 6 Solely
increasing the resources allocated to border control has proven fruitless as
a means of eliminating the undocumented worker. Moreover, it seems that
Congress, due to political and economic concerns, is unwilling to accept
the "means-cost" of effectively sanctioning employers to curb the use of
undocumented workers.'0 7 Consequently, illegal immigrants are
persistently used by U.S. employers who are either unable to properly
authenticate the employee's immigration documents,10 8 or choose to
knowingly employ undocumented workers for economic gain.0 9
Considering these realities, Fuller's logic would suggest that the
complete elimination of the undocumented worker is an ill-conceived end
of immigration policy. Removing all undocumented workers has proven
unattainable, inspiring observers to suggest a reassessment of immigration
objectives. These reforms have been illustrated within immigration policy
since the Sure-Tan decision, and have culminated with the Bush proposal.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

See generallyFULLER, supra note 14, at 47 (an analysis of "means and ends").
See Villarejo, supra note 2, at 175-80.
See id.
See id.; see also Nessel, supra note 2, at 395-404.
Villarejo, supra note 2, at 189-90. Villarejo notes:
However, a major loophole was introduced into the law, reportedly as a result of
a private "backroom" agreement between California farm employers and
immigration advocates. In particular, the law was written so that sanctions could
only be applied against employers who "knowingly" hired unauthorized workers.
Thus, an employer who inspects fraudulent documents and can reasonably claim
to be unable to distinguish them from authentic documents is not subject to
sanctions.

Id. Moreover, Villarejo opines that this loophole "was good news to the massive fraudulent
document industry. Reportedly, some of the alleged September 11 hijackers had obtained false
Social Security cards for identity purposes." Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.at 190.
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Within these reforms, the greatest identifiable change is a "means"
reassessment concerning the elimination of the undocumented worker." 0
The visible trend seems to be that the best way to remove an
undocumented worker is simply to recordthem."'
Depending upon one's perspective, the IRCA is either a giant leap
towards Fuller's notion of abandoning ideal ends, or a drastic
reinterpretation of workable means. Although the IRCA amnesty program
effectively conceded the entrenched status of many undocumented
workers, by placing these workers into the recording process the IRCA
accomplished the stated objective of eliminating the undocumented
worker. However, many critics wanted these workers notjust documented,
but removed entirely from the workforce."' These critics were clearly not
on the same page with the IRCA's drafters, who sought to control the
unlawful employment of aliens rather than strictly finding and deporting
these aliens." 3
In realizing the anonymous condition of many undocumented workers,
the IRCA's drafters were clearly knowledgeable of their resource
limitations. "' However, the sanctions' demands upon employers, which
constituted a bold, new means of eliminating undocumented workers,
proved to be equally futile." 5 These sanctions were simply unrealistic and
gave too much flexibility to employers to skirt the regulations. 1 6 To
effectively sanction the employers and impose workable means, the price
imposed upon both the employers' resources and the U.S. economy was
too high for Congress." 7 The compromise given to employers,"'
particularly U.S. agricultural producers," 9 rendered the negotiated
punishment ineffective.
The Bush reform, which is the latest proposal to deal with the
undocumented worker, 20 advances Fuller's idea of abandoning absolute,
impossible ends. The Bush administration has come to realize that the
undocumented worker is irrefutably entrenched, and instead of increasing
110. See Nessel, supra note 2, at 395-404.
111. See id.
112. The Sachem Quality of Life Organization (SQLO), and immigration control group,
suggests "that there is only one solution to the day laborer issue: mass deportation." Bart Jones, A
Forceon the Decline? Day-LaborerFoes Seen as Extremist,N.Y. NEWSDAY, May 6,2002, at A04.
113. IRCA § 274A.
114. See Nessel, supranote 2, at 395-404.
115. See id.
116. See supra text accompany note 109.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See Office of the Press Secretary, supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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the burden on U.S. employers, the Bush reform seeks to shift some of the
responsibility to neighboring countries.' 21 By attempting to move the
"ends" from the elimination of undocumented workers to the stabilization
ofjoint borders, the Bush administration may have found a more effective
"means" of curbing illegal immigration. Although this proposal allows for
temporary workers, 2 2 it signifies the largest step toward moving away
from the impossible goal of removing all undocumented workers, and
instead refocuses immigration policy on the broader objectives of
improving border
stability 23 and lessening the root causes of illegal
1 24
immigration.
VII. APPLICATION OF HOLMES'S "BAD MAN" PRINCIPLE

The real divergence from Holmes's thought in undocumented worker
jurisprudence - which consequently has led to the offering of amnesty
programs - has been the almost total failure of employer sanctions. This
was first recognized by Justice Brennan in Sure-Tan, and later evident in
the failings of the IRCA. In Sure-Tan, the inability of undocumented
employees to seek adequate remedies against employers under the NLRA
allowed employers to exploit these workers with little recourse.'25 Clearly,
the sanctions under the IRCA assumed a kind of ethical behavior on the
part of employers which was rampantly sidestepped. In particular, the
IRCA assumed employers would give their best efforts in authenticating
employee documents. This assumption was not only incorrect, but
employers actually began abusing this IRCA loophole26 by knowingly
employing illegal aliens with fraudulent documentation.
Although the judiciary should not have the duty of legislative drafting,
by creating a gap between protection and remedy, the Sure-Tan Court
violated Holmes' principle ofjurisprudence: view the law through the eyes
of the "bad man." In hindsight, it is quite apparent that the Court's mistake
in interpreting the NLRA was quickly exploited by employers,'27 and
confirmed the concerns outlined in Justice Brennan's dissent. 128 This surge
121. Id. When referring to "neighbors," it is quite clear that Mexico is the central focus of the
Bush immigration proposal. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Sure-Tan, Inc., 467 U.S. 883, 912 (1984) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
126. See supra text accompanying note 109.
127. Id.
128. Sure-Tan, Inc., 467 U.S. at 912 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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of employers engaging in the exploitation of illegal aliens, as demonstrated
in Sure-Tan, eventually led to the passage of the IRCA only a few years
later. Nevertheless, the Court's error was soon trumped by the IRCA's
drafters, who also failed to observe the Holmesian principle of the "bad
man."
By inserting the "knowingly" requirement into the IRCA sanctions, the
IRCA drafters also assumed that employers would adhere to certain ethical
standards.129 Namely, the IRCA drafters assumed that employers would
attempt to correctly authenticate their employee's immigration documents
and take appropriate actions if the documents were fraudulent (or never
produced by the employee). 3 As previously noted, this assumption was
dangerously wrong. Instead of creating laws that were aimed at deterring
unethical employers, these regulations allowed many unscrupulous
employers to avoid sanctions.'31
Furthermore, the drafters' failure to adhere to the "bad man" principle
consequently led to employers purposely hiring illegal aliens under the
guise of ignorance.' 32 This not only allowed these employers to form a
quasi-slave labor pool of low-paid, overworked illegal aliens, but because
the employers knew that these employees could be deported on a whim,"'
some employers were permitted to terrorize their workforce with relative
impunity.'34 By not removing the "knowingly" requirement,"' the IRCA
drafters severely undermined the "crack-down" intent of the legislation. 36
129. See supra text accompanying note 109.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Supra text accompanying note 109.
135. Id.
136. The House Education and Labor Committee Report on the Immigration Reform and
Control Act (IRCA) states, "It is not the intention of the Committee that the employer sanctions
provisions of the [Immigration Reform and Control Act] be used to undermine or diminish in any
way labor protections in existing law..." H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 58 (1986); see also
Nessel, supranote 2, at 345 n. 1. The House Committee also states:
In addition, the committee does not intend that any provision of this Act would
limit the powers of State or Federal labor standards agencies such as ... the
National Labor Relations Board... in conformity with existing law, to remedy
unfair practices committed against undocumented employees for exercising their
rights before such agencies or for engaging in activities protected by these
agencies. To do otherwise would be counter-productive of our intent to limit the
hiring of undocumented employees and the depressing effect on working
conditions caused by their employment.
H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 2, at 8-9 (1986).
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It is also now accepted that the number of illegal aliens gaining
employment within the United States is substantially larger than before the
IRCA's enactment.'
After years of minor change concerning the
undocumented worker, the Bush proposal sought to end the employer
exploitation of illegal aliens.
In assuming an otherwise lawful undocumented worker, the Bush
reform has seemingly moved further away from the notion of Holmes's
"bad man." However, this notion, when analyzed beneath the exterior
layers, is somewhat mistaken. Although Holmes might have classified an
illegal alien as an inherent lawbreaker, Holmes would also have
recognized that these lawbreakers have just as much incentive as a law
abiding person in "avoiding the public force."' 38 Moreover, when the
government entices these undocumented workers with amnesty programs
to come out of hiding, it can be argued that these newly documented
workers have more to lose through illegal activity' and more incentive to
avoid the authorities. 40 In fact, the only kink in this theoretical armor is
the assumption that the illegal aliens, instead of inherently breaking laws,
will have some understanding of U.S. law,' 4 ' and will subsequently
understand the consequences of breaking these laws.' 42

IX. CONCLUSION

Over the last two decades, the rights afforded illegal aliens in the
workplace have greatly expanded. While forecasting the undocumented
worker's future rights is far beyond the scope of this Note, it is quite clear
that a few fundamental principles of sound lawmaking have had a dramatic
affect on undocumented workerjurisprudence. Foremost is the concession
that there will always be some amount of an undocumented workforce.
This concession has shifted immigration and labor law away from
traditionally restrictive methods to more realistic approaches whereby
illegal aliens are "curbed" but not "eliminated." This change corresponds
to Fuller's notion of understanding one's realistic possibilities and
limitations before a desired end is sought.
Underlying this concession is the notion that morally created legislation
has been unsuccessful in prohibiting the employment of illegal aliens.
When laws are created that expect minimal ethical compliance on behalf
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Supra text accompanying note 109.
See Holmes supranote 34, at 459.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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of possible violators, it has been demonstrated time and again that these
laws are quite ineffective - and often have extremely damaging,
unintended consequences.' 43 Thus, for prohibitive legislation to have a true
impact, the laws must be designed with the most unethical violator in mind
and conform to Holmes's "bad man" principle.
Finally, undocumented worker jurisprudence is at the whim of many
factors beyond mere lawmaking. Global economics and the continuing
influx of legal immigrants into the United States will continue to shape
attitudes and fears towards illegal aliens. As these factors are everchanging, lawmakers must constantly reassess their true "means and ends"
to create sound legislation that fits within the expanding global
marketplace. Otherwise, lawmakers will enact legislation that does not
effectively deter or sanction potential lawbreakers.

143. Nessel, supra note 2, at 361-62.
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